

United States Exceptionalism and the Rise of Chinese Power

Nicholas C. Birosik

The Pennsylvania State University

Schreyer Honors College

## Introduction

For the majority of the modern era, differences in culture, societal norms and political values have gilded the curtain of the international stage. The stratification of these cultural conventions has provided for the unique development of states and has simultaneously led to periods of hostility between those with incongruent institutional value systems. Take for example the rigid dichotomy that exists between the system of governance and values of both China and the United States: one a communist, civil liberty censoring, and astonishingly low scoring state on the CATO Human Freedom Index,<sup>1</sup> and the other a capitalistic, democratic republic aiming to promote the longevity of intellectual freedoms. As recently as the early 1970s (Fig 1.),<sup>2</sup> their delicate relationship was





Fig. 1, Comparison of CINC values of USA, UK, China and Russia since 1896<sup>2</sup>.

exacerbated by China's sharp rise, and eventual overtake of the United States' power. Given China's starkly different value set and that they have surpassed the United States, the dominant power (hegemon) who is charged with setting the norms for the rest of the international body, what should be expected to abound from this new relationship? Power Transition Theory deals with matters such as these between a challenger who vies for the title of dominant state. The theory suggests that the critical question to pose during these periods of uncertainty is: is China content with being a great power, a veritable second place standing to


the US – are they satisfied with the institutional norms that the US has imposed over them? Moreover, if China is not satisfied with the US' imposition of the norms on the international system, to what degree would they be willing to venture to attain the coveted status as dominant power for themselves – is war with the United States out of the question? Employing Power Transition Theory will estimate the outcome of such conflict: should China be dissatisfied, war with the US would be inevitable. I argue that war with the United States will never be instigated by China for there exists clear oversights in how this theory predicts outcomes during periods of power transition. One omission is the rational actor assumption: no rational actor, a state who is looking out for their best interests, would be able to justify taking such caustic action without clear incentives – and truly, as will be discussed later, there is no incentive for provoking war based on uncertainty. I further argue that China is partially satisfied with the impositions of the West, based upon their economic success via their considerable stakes therein.

## What is Power Transition Theory

Originally penned in his 1958 textbook *World Politics*, A.F.K. Organski described the requisite conditions necessary to forecast the outcome of conflict between the strongest of states during times of transitional power – a period where a great state (a challenger) is approaching power parity with the dominant state (the defender), the most powerful in the international system. When the states have entered this period of near-power parity, there exists uncertainty as to who the victor would be in the event of war between the two states (note the middle-section of Fig. 2); aptly named



Power Transition Theory, Organski first focuses his argument on the international *status quo*, an abbreviation describing to the patterns of international orders emerging from the will of the Hegemonic Power. These international *status quos* govern the social, political, economic and militaristic standards between state actors in the international system. The *status quo* is an effective extension of the dominant state's domestic norms – a projection of their national values upon the international forum. As expected, these *status quos* have been established exclusively to advance the long-term pecuniary, militaristic and economic interests of the Dominant State; these interests are also inadvertently extended to other states which are considered to be 'satisfied' – these are state that accept the standards imposed by the dominant power (generally because these nations are 'institutionally' similar to them). Power Transition Theory further notes the greater number of satisfied states that exist, the less war-prone the international system is; this, though, has never been seen because of the stark differences in the social, political and economic constructs of the various states of the world. Because of the stratification of these values, states may also be considered dissatisfied (See Fig 3. for distribution). Dissatisfaction occurs when these lesser states' – a state which is ranked lower than the dominant in Fig 3. –



domestic institutions are hindered by the international *status quo* enacted by the dominant power. Certain reasons for dissatisfaction may spawn from the lack of diplomatic discourse during the creation of these new norms, a lack of

benefit from the imposed norms, or simply that the institutions that ameliorate values in the dominant state do not augur well with institutions that disseminate domestic value in some lesser state. Indeed, the isolation or outright refusal of their institutional value systems may have been created entirely by design of the dominant power in order to stack the international system against them; thus, paving the way for the dominant state's perpetual hierarchical preponderance over any objectors.

Ergo, this theory can be typified neither as Realist or Liberal. By convention of states being content with other states in the international body alone, there exists an inevitable deviation from the 'complete-anarchical' world upon which each argument finds their respective foundation – the anarchical substrate panned off by this theory is called 'conditional anarchy' and suggests that there exists certain satisfied and dissatisfied states that comprise the international system. It should also be noted that by virtue of being a satisfied state, smaller powers will be protected 'under the wing' of the dominant state and therefore are less prone to attack by a dissatisfied state. Think of it like this, the smaller satisfied states know who to go to for help, while dissatisfied states have no clear dependence and thus live in a state of anarchy; therefore, if there are some states that are satisfied with the *status quo*, they will never willingly challenge the dominant power to change these standards, because they, too, find a clear incentive (be it financial, militaristic, political, protection, etc.) to abide by them. If not for the satisfied states to attempt to overtake dominant power then it is a logical sequitur for Power Transition Theory to examine the interactions of the dissatisfied states. As will be discussed at some length below, the power of a nation is recognized by many social-scientists as their Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score – a score which concisely frames

the degree of access to mobilizable assets of value. When a state has a proportionally overwhelming lead over another state in terms of their CINC score, they are considered to be preponderant over the lesser state. Power Transition Theory posits that during periods of preponderance war is unlikely because a clear winner is easily identifiable – should an unsatisfied state wage war against a clearly preponderant state they will be predictably decimated – and thus the lesser state will not wage war; and, this low-war potential is regarded similarly under the conditions of challenger preponderance, too. See the power line for each party in the rightmost and leftmost columns of Fig. 2, note the ease of discernment of the preponderant power. Therefore, Power Transition Theory focuses its attention on the approach of power parity, a power equivalency, where a clear winner is not so likely to be forecasted, the center column in Fig. 2. It is within this nondescript period of time that dissatisfied states are considered to be the most militaristically volatile and willing to fight for the opportunity to uproot the international *status quo* in order to impart their own. Once a challenger approaches and commences the overtake of the dominant power, they are considered to have the ‘opportunity’ to wage-war. Finally the theory argues that a challenger who has the opportunity must also be ‘willing’ to wage war and change the international standards.<sup>3</sup> In so doing, should the challenger come out on top, they would be able to replace the *status quo* that was enacted by the previous dominant power and implace one of their own. This would shuffle up the state of conditional anarchy, some dissatisfied states may become satisfied under the new regime’s impositions and *vis-a-vis*. Beyond mere rearrangement of satisfaction, the new hegemonic power (used interchangeably with dominant power) would then be able to reap the rewards of an international system that was

tailored to the standards of their own domestic institutions; therefore, giving them a direct advantage over the previous dominant power. They too, could author standards which intrinsically disenfranchise the domestic institutions and or the economic interests of the old dominant state – a final power play to ensure that they stay on top of the new international hierarchy and are free from further retaliation.

### **How is Power Defined & How China Took the Lead**

This section explains exactly how the power in Power Transition theory both defined and measured in this context, and what series of events has allowed China to become a preponderant power over the United States. The fundamental definition of power which is both the most accurate and widely accepted by International Relations scholars is derived from J. David Singer’s 1963 *Correlates of War*, Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). To researchers, such as Garrett Heckman of Louisiana State University, CINC’s methodology incorporates more ‘salient’ factors to determine the true power of a state beyond mere GDP alone.<sup>4</sup> Mathematically this model averages a state’s percentage of the world share in six capability measurements (State’s Potential / World’s Combined Potential) branched under three distinct categories: Demography, Economy and Military. The relative measures are: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, total number of troops and military expenditures (See Fig. 4 for the CINC formula).


$$\frac{TPR + UPR + ISPR + ECR + MER + MPR}{6}$$

Fig. 4 | CINC formula

I argue that the defining moment in China’s growth in power is their population boom under Mao Zedong beginning in the early 1960s: Mao’s *Great Leap Forward*. This population boom, as was similarly seen in the United States

after World War II, led to a growth in population, energy consumption concomitant with rapid industrialization, and military manpower and expenditure. These defining characteristics have continuously grown alongside population, through present, directly leading to a perpetual boost in their CINC score. This assertion is sustained by the following examination of relevant statistics.

Beginning in the 1990s, China has seen exponential growth in their energy consumption. In 2018 the U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that China was consuming 140 Quadrillion BTUs (QBTUs) while the United States had only consumed 97.3 QBTUs in that same year.<sup>5</sup> A prerequisite for the growth of a nation is its production of goods and the mobilization of its masses, and in order for one to produce, one must consume; China is now consuming – growing – at a rate faster than ever before (Fig. 5)<sup>6</sup> due to their expansion and



near-monopolization in the global trade forum. With trade policies in their favor, they are able to reach new markets and fulfill a greater demand thus creating an upward trend in energy consumption; as time progresses the gap will only widen because China will continue to consume more until they are fully developed. The United States, who, unlike China, already hit their development peak in the early 2000s and will continue to idle around the 100 QBTU consumption mark. The second measure in which China has a surpassing precedence is

military capacity. While it is true that the United States spends \$400 billion more than China on Defense, China's compulsory service of 18-24 year olds means that they enjoy more than two-million active duty soldiers (the US 1.2 million),<sup>7,8,9</sup> a reserve capacity of over five-hundred thousand,<sup>10</sup> and well over 7.2 million citizens marked for conscription-based service if need be. China is ranked, handedly, ahead of the United States in terms of GI mobility. Considering there are only 27.5 million military personnel in the world,<sup>11</sup> China's holding of 7% of the world's military manpower and 10.3% of the world's total military funding, makes their stake in the global military market is anything but insignificant. Thirdly, China has overtaken the United States in iron and steel production; based on data sourced from 2012, China has been producing over 121 million tons or 45% of the world's steel annually,<sup>12</sup> a record high not enjoyed by the United States since its sharp decline in production following the end of World War II.<sup>13</sup> Finally, the figure upon which all others find their foundation is China's share of the world's population. Currently, China holds 18.1% of the world's population,<sup>14</sup> while the United States pales behind holding a mere 4.27%;<sup>15</sup> this is the most impactful metric China has against the United States in the CINC score calculation – note also the implications that such a massive population means for the other measures in the CINC calculation such as the need for additional BTU consumption.

Based on these statistics, it is quantitatively evident how China quickly became preponderant over the United States via the CINC score. It is important to also note that all of the aforementioned measures are *still* increasing at a rate faster than that of the United States. If these trends continue as predicted, China is likely to continue shadowing the United States' power for the duration of the foreseeable future. To demonstrate China's preponderance over the

United States, in 2007 China's CINC score was already 5% greater than that of the United States, sitting at 19.85% of the world's total power share.

**What Does Power Transition Theory Predict in the US / China Power Transition**

As was well established in the above header, China has surpassed the United States in terms of power; it was also noted that China's power growth slope still has a positive differential meaning the power divide is likely to be not only maintained but also widened for the duration of the foreseeable future. Up until the early 1970s the United States was preponderant to China which served as a clear enough justification as to why China did not attempt to overtake the title of dominant statehood (the two states were in the left-most section of Fig 2.). Then, China was approaching parity with the United States (for approach in power, see Fig 1. at the first positive differential coefficient around 1970); thereby moving the relationship of the states into the middle section of Fig. 2 – the most militaristically volatile. By the early 2000s, China finally attained power parity with the United States. For the last 19 years, China's power has grown increasingly more preponderant over that of the United States. According to Power Transition Theory, if China is not satisfied, they should be provoking war any minute with the United States for the title of dominant power. That is unless China is indeed a satisfied nation or there exists error or misgiving with the theory.

It is my informed opinion that China will not wage war with the United States because they are satisfied *de facto* by way of their complex economic relationship with the US – *and* – there exist clear oversights in Power Transition Theory's modeling. In the previous instance, China's bilateral economic relationship with the US drives the majority of their economic output;

the focus of my argument, however, will be based on analysing the faults of the theory rather than ways in which the theory attempts to explain China's satisfaction. There have been a wealth of studies conducted on sino-american economic interdependence and therefore would not be worthwhile rehashing in this paper – the authors of these scholarly articles note the complex economic interdependence that these two state enjoy, noting if one should collapse so would the other, thus leaving behind international economic instability.<sup>16,17,18,19</sup>

So the question remains: is China satisfied? This is an incredibly difficult question to answer because satisfaction itself is an abstract variable that is very difficult to measure. Because there are a plethora of potential ways to operationalize it, it is nearly impossible to find a standard that adjudicates this variable without inducing research bias. Two models that I use to determine China's satisfaction is the finding of the scholarly papers on Chinese contentment with Western trade and economic standards as well as their lack of militaristic conquest of the United States. China's satisfaction can be found in their lack of military engagement with the United States during the span of the past 19 years post power parity. This leads into my first hesitancy with trusting this theory. The theory may be producing the correct results, but correct results for the wrong reasons, Power Transition Theory, therefore, needs to be refined so it can more accurately predict outcomes during periods of power transition.

The purpose of a theory, such as Power Transition Theory, is to generalize a certain result to a given condition. There are many flaws with this theory, especially with regards to what variables it decides is important to account for and what it simultaneously calls to omit. Power Transition Theory finds its roots in the principle of uncertainty, not being able to determine a clear winner should two states go to war. My first qualm is based under the assumption that

these states *are* rational actors, that is to say that they are always looking out for their own best interests. For example, say these states are indeed rational actors and they have just attained power parity with another state, a circumstance where *uncertainty of outcome* is made to be the pervasive motif. Why, then, would that rational state choose to risk everything in hopes to gain such a notional title? What is the true benefit of war fought against an equal power? Yes, Power Transition Theory suggests that the challenger would get to redefine the *status quo*, but under what authority would they be able to enforce it (and who would say that the challenger would be the winner in the first place, remember the theory is based on the fundamentals of uncertainty)? Both of the state's armies, after the war, would arguably have decimated each other, their respective economies would have both plummeted, and then according to the CINC score both powers would be equally disadvantaged (by means of smaller military, economy, and population). Ergo, whichever winner emerges from the fight would be liable to be attacked again by the state holding the veritable third place, Russia, who would easily be able to mobilize even half of their military and secure the hegemonic power for themselves. To what avail would these two equal powers be fighting? A cataclysmic future in which there were no winners, only two sore losers. As rational actors, there is no benefit for taking a multivariate gamble that would only ensure political instability and a certain victory for a party other than the two engaged in this conflict. It would be a better argument to assert that dissatisfied challenger preponderance is the only condition for shifts of dominant power status as well as alterations to the *status quo*, for there is a clear victor with direct incentives to uproot the current norms and impose their own.

My second concern with this theory is that it fails to account for alliances between the two states. By the CINC power measure between

China and the United States, the previous holds a strong lead; however, when China's power is juxtaposed against the United States and its allies, other states that would fight on the US' behalf, the balance of power would tilt to a 70 / 30 split in the US' favor. Assuming the rational actor condition, China would never wage war until they had attained power parity with the US *and* its allies – which is unattainable. This is a clear oversight in the theory that needs to be remedied, perhaps by incorporating allyship into the diagram; State X and their allies are at power parity with State Y, and therefore are more liable to go to war. This implementation is also flawed due in part to logical reasoning that half of the world would never realistically mobilize to fight the other half (especially considering the fallout of the alliance-web during the Great War & WWII), and that some alliances will fall through when they are called on for action.

My final concern with this theory is the nondescript period of approach and overtake which decides this period of uncertainty – is the US / China power transition still in the 'most militaristically volatile' center of the chart, or has the relationship transcended into the realm of challenger preponderance? If the latter, China must be satisfied or the theory is wrong. Again I must beseech how is such an abstract variable accurately and judiciously measured? Are there any conditions of deterrence, such as those articulated above, that would be causing a spurious correlation between China's power dominance and their being content with being a great power rather than the dominant power? Such concerns spark criticism of the *quasi*-communist state China endorses. Their ascription of the economic values of the West seem to demonstrate that their people – and most certainly their leaders – enjoy great benefit from the capitalistic norms of the international system. I would even go as far as to say that China's acceptance of the norms of the hegemonic state demonstrates their

partial-satisfaction under the climate imposed by the same. Because there exist no clear way to otherwise classify a state that partially accepts and partially rejects the *status quo* – and granted the prosperity China has enjoyed – should the theory account for a new classification entitled ‘partially-satisfied’ state; to that end, this would mean under the state of conditional-anarchy, that they state would need to be inappropriately cast into either satisfied or unsatisfied classification; which therefore induces greater uncertainty as to the viability of this theory. Fortunately enough for the fate of the world, there exist clear flaws, miscalculations and oversights in Power Transition Theory which forebodes an inevitable cataclysmic war between China and the United States. I’ll dispel the theory’s forgone conclusion now: there will be no war between China and the United States over the title of dominant power.

### **Conclusion**

Power Transition Theory describes an international world order that is stratified by levels of relative power, described by Organski as a triangle where the weaker states comprise the foundation and the strongest state, the hegemon, on the top. The hegemon, known in this theory as the dominant state (used interchangeably with dominant power), has special privileges over the international system. A certain privilege is ameliorating domestic institutions ideologies, or norms, across the international system thus defining the *status quo*, the informal rules, patterns and customs of interstate interaction. The desire to become the dominant power lies in understanding that contouring the *status quo* to any given state’s domestic norms will ultimately benefit them in the long run; other states that are satisfied are, too, considered benefactors of the *status quo*. Because there exists a climate whereby some states are considered to be satisfied and others not, Power Transition Theory oft refers to an

international system as a state of *conditional anarchy*. States that are hindered economically, socially or politically by these norms are more likely to contest their imposition. Power Transition Theory predicts that if one of these dissatisfied states eventually attains power parity with the hegemonic state, the likelihood of war to obtain control of the international system, and thus the privilege of redefining the status quo, is expected to plateau: war between the dominant power and the challenging great power is inevitable.

As is the case with China, they had seen a rise in their CINC score over the past 50 years. In the early 2000s, they attained parity with the United States. According to Power Transition Theory, unless China was a satisfied state, there should have been a war between the US and China. I argue that China is a partially-satisfied state because of their fierce dependence on the economic customs that the United States has imposed on the international system. Because there is no clear way to categorize grey states like China in the state of conditional anarchy – which calls for classification by the extreme of fully satisfied or fully dissatisfied – it is impossible to determine whether or not China is satisfied with the international norms imposed by the United States. Thus, determining whether or not the theory is correct in its prediction of outcome cannot simply be justified by the ambiguous measure of satisfaction alone. One method of proving the validity of this theory, then, takes the form of seeking out flaws to prove the counterfactual – the theory itself is wrong.

Upon doing so, I happened upon three distinct flaws in the theory's presentation of the question of what happens during periods of power traintion. First and most pressingly was the exclusion of the rational actor assumption – the theory failed to consider that rational actors are looking out for their own best interests and would never wage everything in a time of

uncertainty where the reward is nothing more than the complete annihilation of their own country's power. The second criticism is that China would never wage war with the United States under the pretense of also having to fight all of its allies, too. I suggested that the theory adapt a second model whereby the power of both states' and their allies respective power can be conflated and be implemented into the power transition chart, this would make the argument slightly more compelling; yet the draw back of rational actorship comes into question as to whether or not these states could entertain the thought of total war for a *for-null* consequence – the destruction of the entire world's civilization. My final contention is that the theory never concretely explicated the time frame for the center part of Fig. 4. Leaving it up for debate as to when we should or should not be expecting war between these states. If the theory would be more refined in its use of variables, time-frames and other measures, it would be a more convincing argument for whether or not two states would be willing to wage war in the name of attaining dominant power in the international system.

There is much greater support for other arguments such as Balance of Power Theory which is based in the fundamentals of democracies not fighting each other, non-neighbors not fighting, assuming power projection. Power Transition Theory has a clear, falsifiable hypothesis that should be empirically rejected; it has clear oversights in its modeling efforts, and until such changes are made to remedy these deficiencies I am fully convinced, based upon the above findings, that there will never be a war between the United States and China, especially under the pretenses of China desiring to ascertain the title of dominant power.

### **Further Reading**

Now that you have been acquainted with PTT, if you are interested in reading more into the continued quantitative analysis of this project, please visit [PreferredNerd.github.io](https://PreferredNerd.github.io). The objective of this continued study is to exploit the COW dataset in order to further refine PTT among other theories which are related to national security politics. The continued analysis accomplish this by exploring the distribution of CINC scores during different periods of time, to determine the period of power transition between the Hegemon and an approaching power a period known as the most militaristically volatile; through this study the significance of the CINC score is juxtaposed against other metrics used to predict the true power of a state.

The research question that has guided this project is: Which method of measuring state power best models their actual power score? This information will prove valuable to the entire International Relations field of study. It will find implications in the accurate application of key theories in that domain. One such example is predicting outcomes posited by Power Transition Theory, in cases such as the proposed conflict between states such as China and The United States which was erstwhile discussed in this paper.

### Notes

1. Vásquez, Ian, and Tanja Porčnik. "Executive Summary." *The Human Freedom Index 2018, A Global Measurement of Personal, Civil, and Economic Freedom*, Cato Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, 2018, pp. 9–13.
2. Data points extrapolated from: Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972, et. seq.). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.
3. STARR, H. (1978) "Opportunity" and "Willingness" as Ordering Concepts in the Study of War. *International interactions* 4:363-387.
4. Garrett Heckman. "POWER CAPABILITIES AND SIMILARITY OF INTERESTS: A TEST OF THE Power Transition Theory" 2019, pp. 1-2
5. EIA. "U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis." *Table 1.3 Primary Energy Consumption Estimates by Source, 1949-2011 (Quadrillion Btu)*, 2019, [www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.php?t=ptb0103](http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.php?t=ptb0103).
6. EIA. "U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis." *China's Projected Energy Consumption Mainly Depends on Its Overall Growth Rate - Today in Energy - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)*, 25 July 2018, [www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36752](http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36752).
7. International Institute for Strategic Studies (14 February 2018). *The Military Balance 2018*. Routledge. pp. 249–259. ISBN 978-1-85743-955-7.
8. Ashley, Robert P. "China Military Power." *Defense Intelligence Agency*, 3 Jan. 2019, [www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China\\_Military\\_Power\\_FI\\_NAL\\_5MB\\_20190103.pdf](http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FI_NAL_5MB_20190103.pdf). Pp.7
9. "Number of Military and DoD Appropriated Fund (APF) Civilian Personnel Permanently Assigned". U.S. Department of Defense. 31 December 2017.
10. Ibid.
11. "Armed Forces Personnel, Total." *The World Bank*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance.*, 2016, [data.worldbank.org/indicator/ms.mil.totl.p1](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ms.mil.totl.p1).
12. "In China's Floundering Steel Sector, the Burden of Politics". *The New York Times*. Reuters. 3 May 2012.
13. Steele-Gordon, John. "A Brief History of the American Steel Industry." *National Material Company - Steel Processing Facilities*, 24 Jan. 2018, [www.nationalmaterial.com/brief-history-american-steel-industry/](http://www.nationalmaterial.com/brief-history-american-steel-industry/).
14. "Chinese Official Population Clock (updated daily, in Chinese)". National Bureau of Statistics of China.
15. "United States Official Population Clock (updated daily)". USCB.
16. Economist. "Sino-American Interdependence Has Been a Force for Geopolitical Stability." *The Economist*, *The Economist Newspaper*, 23 June 2018, [www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/06/23/sino-american-interdependence-has-been-a-force-for-geopolitical-stability](http://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/06/23/sino-american-interdependence-has-been-a-force-for-geopolitical-stability). *Note*: the argument made on interdependence between the two economies -- as a foundation or the argument that they will never attack each other due to China's satisfaction; where China's satisfaction is a direct measure of the satisfaction of their leaders who will enjoy the wealth from trade with us.
17. Saunders, Phillip C. "Supping with a long spoon: dependence and interdependence in Sino-American relations." *The China Journal* 43 (2000): 55-81.
18. Evans, Michael. "Power and paradox: Asian geopolitics and Sino-American relations in the 21st century." *Orbis* 55.1 (2011): 85-113.
19. Rui, K. O. N. G. "The Interdependent Relationship of Sino-American Economy from the Angle of Intra-industry Trade [J]." *Journal of International Trade* 9 (2006).